Ulaanbaatar (Mongolia) – A closer look at how digital space is being exploited and the signs of cyber-populism that emerged in the 2017 presidential campaign in Mongolia.
Mongolia’s 2017 presidential campaign displayed some of the fake news and hate speech that have come to characterize the deteriorating public discourse worldwide, including in Asia. Professor Munkhtsetseg Tserenjamts of the Mongolian State University is an expert on digital populism. She presented some of her observations at an event organized by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Mongolia on the limits of freedom of expression, political communication and social media. The following expands some of those ideas.
As the number of users has increased recently, social media is seeing more and more use as a platform for populist policies. In fact we can see the emergence of a distinct digital populism. Populist politicians have started taking advantage of the unregulated space of social media to spread false news and accusations.
Social media is being widely utilized by those politicians who claim to be unsophisticated representatives of the general public against the politicians of a long-standing oligarchic group. Social media represents an immense opportunity for the promises of populist politicians to reach a wide public with unprecedented speed and scope. This was seen in the US presidential campaign in 2016, and the French and Mongolian ones in 2017.
It is worth taking a closer look at how digital space is being exploited and the signs of cyber-populism that emerged in the Mongolian case.
Three candidates ran in 2017: the Speaker of Parliament Miyegombo Enkhbold from the ruling Mongolian People’s Party; Khaltmaa Battulga, a businessman of the opposition Democratic Party; and Sainkhuu Ganbaatar, a labour union activist from the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party. However, none of the three candidates won the required 50 per cent in the first round of the election, requiring a second-round run-off vote.
The Democratic Party’s Battulga won 50.6 per cent of the run-off ballot against parliament speaker Enkhbold from the Mongolian People’s Party.
The presidential campaign lasted for 18 days. The political TV-ads and election pamphlets, traditional features of election campaigning, were limited relative to previous elections.
As a result, the candidates of the People’s Party and the Democratic Party extensively exploited social media. Ganbaatar focused more on face-to-face contact in his campaigning strategy.
The numbers of voters that received information about the presidential candidates from Facebook reached 39.3 per cent during the campaign.
Although TV is a major source of political information, the influence of social media is increasing in each year. An estimated 74.6 per cent of voters still receive information about the presidential candidates from TV, but the numbers now getting such information from Facebook has reached 39.3 per cent, according to a survey by the Political Communication Institute during the election.
Around 5.4 per cent responded that they receive political information from Twitter. If we look at those people who receive their electoral and political information from Facebook, they are mainly in the age range of 18-40, living either in Ulaanbaatar or in aimag center.
How did presidential candidates use social media for their campaign?
During the election campaign, the Democratic Party’s Khaltmaa engaged in mudslinging and corruption accusations on social media against his rival Enkhbold. Enkhbold has launched his own negative political campaign in retaliation against Khaltmaa, mainly on Twitter. The Democratic Party’s team ran material on Enkhbold’s purported Chinese ethnic heritage, hinting that his success might lead to China taking over in the future.
This smearing on social media during the 2017 campaign was independently observed by the Political Communication Institute.
Now let’s take a look at the most popular fake news that ran during the election. The Democratic Party’s campaign team started posting three separate but connected videos. Of those, two titled "The Death of a Brave Mongolian", and "Insulting Great Genghis Khan" were posted on June 1 and 2, before the campaign officially started. All were published and shared on the largest groups and pages on Facebook.
Within 48 hours, after the video about Enkhbold’s Chinese ethnic background was released, it had close to 100,000 views and has been shared thousands of times on Facebook. It was republished online on several news websites under the title "Inevitable proof is found regarding Enkhbold’s Chinese origin" on the same day when the initial video released, June 2, 2017.
In the comments section of these videos, people expressed their concern that a pure Mongolian should be chosen, saying Enkhbold was of Chinese ancestry on his mother’s side, lineage, and using some negative language insulting him.
"The Death of a Brave Mongolian" was published with a short caption – “Chinese people are running over and killing a Mongolian”. This one was also posted on the largest groups and pages on Facebook, and people also shared it on their personal accounts.
The video "Insulting Great Genghis Khan" depicts Chinese people acting in a disrespectful way towards the portrait of Genghis Khan. It has been shared on the largest groups of Facebook and had several thousand views.
It has been seen that most of the comments under these videos were driven by hatred and xenophobia against Enkhboold’s Chinese ethnicity, the argument being that the people should only elect a pure-blood Mongolian. The fact that people believed the videos without questioning shows how they fed into and fuelled a long-standing xenophobic fear against China, and was observed in the above-mentioned survey.
In conclusion, the 2017 presidential election shows that none of the candidates focussed on their campaign platforms, and instead engaged in negative campaigning including mudslinging, hate speech against neighbouring China, and fake news. ###
Munkhtsetseg Tserenjamts holds a Ph.D in Political Science. Currently she works as Associate Professor at the Mongolian State University where she is also Director of the Political Communication Institute. She can be followed on Twitter @Munkhtsetseg2001.
Through a series of policy workshops in Mongolia, young political party supporters receive hands-on experience to work together and develop policy…
An annual summit in Mongolia can serve as a platform for dialogue over the Korean Peninsula, in particular in the wake of the Kim-Trump summit in…
Bringing together the work of our offices in the region, we provide you with the latest news on current debates, insightful research and innovative visual outputs on geopolitics, climate and energy, gender justice, trade unions and social-ecological transformation.
In the face of a growing climate crisis, the military industry is promoting "eco-friendly" weapons and technologies, but are these innovations truly... More
Vietnam’s rapid urbanization is bringing both opportunities and challenges. Among the most significant challenges is the preservation of cultural... More
Listening to the voice of youth for a just energy transition has never been this crucial before! In August 2024, the Regional Communications... More
This site uses third-party website tracking technologies to provide and continually improve our services, and to display advertisements according to users' interests. I agree and may revoke or change my consent at any time with effect for the future.
These technologies are required to activate the core functionality of the website.
This is an self hosted web analytics platform.
Data Purposes
This list represents the purposes of the data collection and processing.
Technologies Used
Data Collected
This list represents all (personal) data that is collected by or through the use of this service.
Legal Basis
In the following the required legal basis for the processing of data is listed.
Retention Period
The retention period is the time span the collected data is saved for the processing purposes. The data needs to be deleted as soon as it is no longer needed for the stated processing purposes.
The data will be deleted as soon as they are no longer needed for the processing purposes.
These technologies enable us to analyse the use of the website in order to measure and improve performance.
This is a video player service.
Processing Company
Google Ireland Limited
Google Building Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin, D04 E5W5, Ireland
Location of Processing
European Union
Data Recipients
Data Protection Officer of Processing Company
Below you can find the email address of the data protection officer of the processing company.
https://support.google.com/policies/contact/general_privacy_form
Transfer to Third Countries
This service may forward the collected data to a different country. Please note that this service might transfer the data to a country without the required data protection standards. If the data is transferred to the USA, there is a risk that your data can be processed by US authorities, for control and surveillance measures, possibly without legal remedies. Below you can find a list of countries to which the data is being transferred. For more information regarding safeguards please refer to the website provider’s privacy policy or contact the website provider directly.
Worldwide
Click here to read the privacy policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=en
Click here to opt out from this processor across all domains
https://safety.google/privacy/privacy-controls/
Click here to read the cookie policy of the data processor
https://policies.google.com/technologies/cookies?hl=en
Storage Information
Below you can see the longest potential duration for storage on a device, as set when using the cookie method of storage and if there are any other methods used.
This service uses different means of storing information on a user’s device as listed below.
This cookie stores your preferences and other information, in particular preferred language, how many search results you wish to be shown on your page, and whether or not you wish to have Google’s SafeSearch filter turned on.
This cookie measures your bandwidth to determine whether you get the new player interface or the old.
This cookie increments the views counter on the YouTube video.
This is set on pages with embedded YouTube video.
This is a service for displaying video content.
Vimeo LLC
555 West 18th Street, New York, New York 10011, United States of America
United States of America
Privacy(at)vimeo.com
https://vimeo.com/privacy
https://vimeo.com/cookie_policy
This cookie is used in conjunction with a video player. If the visitor is interrupted while viewing video content, the cookie remembers where to start the video when the visitor reloads the video.
An indicator of if the visitor has ever logged in.
Registers a unique ID that is used by Vimeo.
Saves the user's preferences when playing embedded videos from Vimeo.
Set after a user's first upload.
This is an integrated map service.
Gordon House, 4 Barrow St, Dublin 4, Ireland
https://support.google.com/policies/troubleshooter/7575787?hl=en
United States of America,Singapore,Taiwan,Chile
http://www.google.com/intl/de/policies/privacy/