Militarism and gender conflict: The shadow of conscription in South Korean society

By Kim Ellim, Feminist Institute for Peace Studies

On October 1, 2024, approximately 5,000 troops and over 340 units of 83 different types of military equipment gathered at Gwanghwamun Square in central Seoul. Even the ‘Hyunmoo-5,’ known as a “monster missile,” the ‘L-SAM,’ a long-range surface-to-air missile, and the B-1B ‘Lancer,’ a supersonic strategic heavy bomber used by the United States Air Force, were publicly displayed. The South Korean government stated that this Armed Forces Day featured a commemorative event and a parade through the city to “demonstrate overwhelming defense capabilities that achieve peace through strength both domestically and internationally.” Despite the criticism that the parade—for the second consecutive year and the first time in 40 years since the military governments—represented excessive budget spending and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the government designated the day as a public holiday, elevating Armed Forces Day to an “important” state affair. The parade of soldiers and weaponry filling the square was a reminder of the shadow of militarism cast over South Korean society.

As numerous feminists have pointed out, militarism and gender inequality are both the root causes and catalysts for each other. In South Korean society, the military sits particularly at the centre of this cycle. Every Korean is bound by the duty of national defense under South Korea’s Constitution, yet the Military Service Act applies only to male citizens. For many young Korean men, the military is a place they must go but never wish to. At the same time, evading military service is considered an unforgivable transgression (always a hot topic across politics, society, and entertainment), and being unable to serve is often viewed as being “incomplete” or “defective.” Government evaluations for service eligibility easily categorize young men into “normal” (eligible for active duty) and “abnormal” (ineligible for active duty) groups. Even those who join the military as “normal” may still face stigma if they struggle in the face of violence, injustices, or ostracization. The violent nature of the military is not limited to physical violence alone.

In previous eras, when gender discrimination was even more pronounced, men regarded military service as an unquestioned duty of citizenship. The state, armed with the logic of national security and appeals to patriotism, used young men as military resources at an unreasonably low cost. Although some men were dissatisfied with the conscription system, their frustration was rarely directed at women. The point when conflicts between gender issues and military service truly began dates back to 1999, when a major controversy erupted over the abolition of the military service bonus point system. Men have now reached a point where they can no longer tolerate the reality that only men are required to serve. A sense of “unfairness” and feelings of resentment dominate their frustrations. Many have started to view young women who do not serve (or bear children) as free riders on national security, and women who advocate for equal citizenship while not equally serving in the military have become targets of criticism. Since then, several constitutional petitions have been filed demanding female conscription, yet the Military Service Act, which mandates conscription for men only, remains unchanged. These decisions were not made by feminist women, but men’s anger quickly turned toward women.

Meanwhile, along with institutional efforts to address gender discrimination, social changes such as higher education levels, increased labour participation, and greater political representation for women have unfolded over a long period. The reinvigoration of feminism in online public forums in 2015 especially empowered young women’s political engagement. The #MeToo movement, protests following the Gangnam Station murder, the “Uncomfortable Courage” protest against biased investigations of illegal filming, and the “Black Protest” demanding decriminalization of abortion became platforms uniting the voices of young women. In response to the growing influence and political participation of progressive women, some conservative political circles mobilized yidaenam (men in their 20s), with policies that divide and provoke gender confrontation openly promoted in the public sphere. Now, “female conscription” has become a lip-service tool for populist politicians seeking votes from young male constituents, surfacing and disappearing every election season. Instead of being discussed in connection with long-term strategies to address the declining birth rate, changing military needs, or various paths to peace on the Korean Peninsula, the issue of conscription instead serves as fuel for gender conflict, intensifying confrontation and competition between genders.

However, if alleged free-riding by women who do not serve in the military is really an issue, would women who do serve be free from this controversy? That is not the reality. More than 70 years have passed since the establishment of female soldiers in the South Korean military, and as of June 2024, female officers and non-commissioned officers numbered approximately 19,200 (10.8% of serving personnel). Despite the gradual expansion of female soldiers, they remain relatively few and endure scrutiny and constant comparison to their male counterparts throughout their military careers. Female soldiers are subjected to the prejudice that they fall short of their male peers due to physical differences, yet paradoxically face a strict expectation to demonstrate skills surpassing those of men. Furthermore, when female soldiers encounter situations arising from the closed and violent nature of the military, the issue is frequently dismissed as something that occurred simply because women are in the military, with the implication that they do not belong there. In addition, within the male-dominant military culture, female soldiers are more vulnerable to sexual discrimination and violence. According to a 2022 report by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, experiences of sexual harassment in the military were four times higher for women (32.1%) than for men (8%), while experiences of bullying were nearly twice as high for women (42.9%) compared to men (22.3%).

Militaristic concepts and language—such as military, defense, and security—rely on a dichotomy of “protecting men” and “protected women.” The division of gender roles inevitably creates a hierarchy, leaving women unable to stand as equal citizens. In South Korea, the strongest basis for this mechanism is whether or not one has completed military service. Those who have not served are seen as unqualified to speak up. In short, women are not considered partners in discussions on national security and social security. Even former President Park Geun-hye, a woman, and current President Yoon Suk-yeol, who received a medical exemption from service, are not free from accusations of “unfulfilled military duty.” The military thus becomes an excuse for men to resent women without much reflection.

This politics of exclusion and hatred ultimately brings adverse results for everyone. The mythologized image of the real soldier or brave male warrior serves neither cisgender women, transgender women, gay men, nor even heterosexual, putatively “normal” men. The army’s attempt to identify and penalize gay male soldiers under the Military Criminal Act, along with the tragic death of Staff SergeantByun Hui-su, who was forcibly discharged after her gender transition, compels us to question whom the South Korean military is truly meant to serve. The same holds true for countless ordinary men who struggled to adapt to military life and soldiers who endured violence and injustices within the military. Militarism pressures citizens to display blind patriotism and self-sacrifice, openly using methods that encourage hatred, hostility, and conflict to facilitate this process. The patriotic mindset of distinguishing “us” from “enemies” and defeating them can, with only a slight variation, be redirected to identify and demonize perceived enemies within. At this point, all Koreans are ultimately victims of this “politics of hostility.”

The views in this article are not necessarily those of FES.