The epicentre of a global conflict

US-China relations play a central role in efforts to craft a framework for the global order; ideally, the duo should help bring stability and structure to international politics. Yet during the past few years, and especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, they have come to symbolize the dysfunctionality of international understanding. Instead of engaging in urgently needed cooperation, they are battling more tenaciously than ever to augment their power and shape the world order.

Southeast Asia as the epicentre

Southeast Asia is the epicentre of the Sino-American global conflict and the crucial geopolitical linchpin in the Indo-Pacific region. It is the location of the Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes; moreover, the countries in this region must find a place to stand between the spheres of influence of the dominant powers on many issues, including especially trade and technology policies.

There have been also numerous incidents between US and Chinese military forces in the South China Sea over the last few years, especially since Beijing began in 2010 to define this marine region as one of its core interests and to advance such interests in more assertive ways. Many observers around the world, but especially in neighbouring states, fear that, in the worst-case scenario, such an incident might spin out of control, leading to a military conflict. There are numerous maritime territorial disputes between China and its neighbours. But in addition to those, the American insistence upon freedom of navigation (as manifested in the US-Indo-Pacific Strategy) is colliding with China’s quest to carve out an exclusive zone of influence and security in Asia while limiting the ability of the US to intervene as much as possible.

China’s assertive conduct in the South China Sea is provoking resistance not only in the United States, but also in the affected countries of Southeast Asia. Accordingly—and despite their ambivalent relationship to the United States—the latter are grateful for American Freedom of Navigation and Overflight operations in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, they themselves have been negotiating with Beijing over rules of conduct in the South China Sea for years.

ASEAN centrality

Amid these events, the countries of Southeast Asia (with a few exceptions) have been at pains not to unilaterally submit to the spheres of influence of either Beijing or Washington. On one hand, they do not want to incur economic disadvantages; on the other, neither do they wish to become pawns in a great-power conflict. Instead, they would prefer to stand their ground and assert their rights as actors to shape events based on their own institutions and designs. Thus, it is not surprising that they appeal to the unity of the region, reaffirm the centrality of ASEAN to ensure their own security, and recently have called for greater resilience against pressure from external powers. One expression of their assertion of sovereignty, their wish to shape events, and their reaction to other countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies (not to mention worries about the potentially negative consequences for their region of an escalation of the Sino-American rivalry) is a plan entitled the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, adopted under Thailand’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2019. 

A further vital interest of the ASEAN countries is free trade treaties, especially the ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes not only the ten ASEAN member countries but also China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Assuming that the agreement is concluded in the second half of 2020, it would give rise to the world’s largest trading bloc, representing half of the world’s population and a third of its collective gross product.