India and the Three Theatres

Until recently, conventional wisdom suggested that the three theatres of tension, namely Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, are distinct, with each presenting unique challenges that require separate approaches. It was commonly believed that the United States and the rest of the West were on the defensive in all three theatres, a view further reinforced by fears of a resurgent Global South and the emergence of a multipolar world that threatens Western dominance.

From an Indian perspective, however, these assumptions merit re-evaluation. Firstly, the three theatres are not isolated; they are deeply interconnected. Take, for instance, the dramatic announcement of the Sino-Russian “no-limits” alliance just before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. China's diplomatic, political, economic, and military support for Moscow has become crucial to Russia’s war efforts. Moreover, China is not the only Asian player in this European conflict: South Korea has become a significant supplier of weapons to Poland, and Russia has enlisted North Korean troops to fight against Ukraine. In turn, Moscow supports China's political and military ambitions in North-East Asia.

The connections between the Middle East and Europe have also become evident. The swift decline of the Assad regime in Syria can be partly attributed to Russia's preoccupation with the war in Ukraine. While Moscow supported Assad during a major threat to his regime in 2015, it made no effort to save him in 2024. Simultaneously, China's influence in the Middle East is growing but remains insufficient to shape recent events significantly. The weakening of Iran further undermines China’s ambitions in the region. For now, the US continues to dominate the Middle East and plays a pivotal role in shaping its developments.

This leads us to a broader question regarding US and Western power. Despite the extensive discourse on American decline, US power continues to grow relative to its peers. Factors such as the shrinking economic size of the Eurozone, a slowdown in the Chinese economy, the limited nature of Russian power, and ongoing American technological innovation suggest that the US will remain a leading force in global affairs for the foreseeable future.

While several non-Western powers have risen, this shift has largely come at the expense of Europe and Japan, rather than the US. The challenge lies not in the relative strength of American power but in the deep divisions within the US regarding when, where, and how to deploy it. The left and right of the American foreign-policy establishment have repeatedly succumbed to temptations that squander US power on ideological misadventures. Over the past decade, there has been a backlash against this approach, with expectations that President Donald Trump’s second term will prioritize restraint in the use of force while decisively employing it when necessary.

Discussions about the Global South have often oversimplified the diverse array of nations in the non-Western world. While Beijing and Moscow seek to exploit anti-Western sentiments in the Global South, many countries have experienced similar dynamics before through movements such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77, which ultimately fell short. Leaders in the non-Western world are increasingly unwilling to be pawns in the ideological games of great powers; they are seeking to negotiate their own interests and are adept at leveraging the contradictions among major powers.

This landscape opens a significant opportunity for a Trump-led West to regain the initiative against the so-called Axis of Resistance across all three contested theatres. One of President Trump’s stated objectives for his second term is to create distance between Moscow and Beijing. Despite their shared interests against the US, both countries require a degree of accommodation with Washington. The real issue is not about lofty ideological principles but rather the terms of their individual settlements with the US. Despite their apparent strength, the regimes within the Axis of Resistance exhibit profound internal weaknesses that cannot be concealed by authoritarian rule. The US can exploit these vulnerabilities and internal divisions more effectively if it sheds the ideological hubris of the post-Cold War era and embraces a disciplined, pragmatic engagement with the world.

India's pragmatic policies in recent decades have positioned it well to benefit from this shifting global dynamic. The ongoing expansion of India’s strategic partnership with the US, regardless of which administration is in power, is likely to see further progress in Trump’s second term. An end to the Ukraine war and potential reconciliation between the West and Russia would significantly benefit India by redirecting international focus towards balancing China in the Indo-Pacific. In the Middle East, India’s deepening ties with both Israel and moderate Arab regimes have proven advantageous, amidst the evolution of the relations between them. The US emphasis on burden-sharing in European and Asian security aligns with India’s aspirations to play a larger role in global affairs. Additionally, the restructuring of the global economic order to reduce reliance on China complements India’s ambitions to become a key player in new manufacturing supply chains and technological cooperation among trusted partners. The primary constraints on India’s potential lie in its ability to accelerate domestic reforms and improve relations with its neighbours.