Unpacking the Geopolitics of Three Theatres: A perspective from the Middle-East

The world is entering an age of reluctant leaders – with gaps left by the United States that no-one wants to fill. This leaves a void and potential for conflagration of tensions that are interconnected even though they flare up in different regions of the world.

Even as the US withdraws from its hitherto role, China’s policy seems more incremental and responsive to global development than a proactive attempt to offer an overarching alternative, let alone a new paradigm of international relations. China’s position as a reluctant leader is based on the growing understanding within the Chinese elite that China is “too tall to hide”. This is highly apparent in the Middle-East where China’s policy relates to general principles and is perceived by local actors as designed to mostly serve economic and commercial interests. This cautious approach that tends to move in small tactical steps give credence to this view.

Currently there is no central actor willing or able to fill the gap (real or perceived) left by the US withdrawal from the region (exemplified mainly by the withdrawal from Afghanistan) as well as the perceived reallocation of resources from the Middle East to theatres further east. India, despite its unique geopolitical position between two political ecosystems, does not perceive itself as a factor in reshaping either one of these arenas or the interface between them. The foreign policy of the European Union within Europe is curtailed by internal disagreements. Hence its ability and willingness to play a proactive role in its southern and eastern neighbourhood is highly limited.

The absence of alternative “great” powers opens the road for the “rise of the rest”, amultipolarity of international influence driven by medium-size players, not as proxies or allies of stronger global powers, but as actors in the cracks between them. This multipolarity reflects a sense of agency and political capacity to act in order the shape the conditions governing their national interests. Among these mid-sized powers from the view in the Middle East, we can include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Morocco. The thread connecting these countries is neutrality and refraining from taking sides in these conflicts; a sort of updated version of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, but this time fulfilled by each country separately and not as part of broader movement. Another feature is a new strategic flexibility: willingness to divert from traditional long-standing national policies to cope with the changing reality to maintain or maximize national capacities and interests. An example of this is the lively debate within the Japanese elite about rebuilding independent military capacities, and developing a military nuclear option.

As the handover of power takes place in Washington, the “rise of the rest” is likely to get a renewed focus. The ambiguity of Trump’s policy in Ukraine and the South China Sea (and to a lesser extent in the Middle East) coupled with the likelihood of radical steps, requires the mid-sized powers to prepare for new eventualities. This need to adapt swiftly may for some states manifest through an attempt to hedge between East and West (for example Saudi Arabia), and for others through an increase in independent national capacities (for example Turkey or Japan).

The Middle East vs. other theatres

The Gaza War has a cross-regional spillover effect on several Asian countries with a significant or majority Muslim population. The identification with Palestinian suffering is a factor in the domestic debate in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. It has put pressure on governments to express clear positions and appear to support the Palestinian cause despite the countries having little to do in this context. This two-level game does not only affect the public discourse but also has attendant effect on relations with the US in turn. US support of Israel is one of the factors that limit many countries’ motivation to cooperate with the US policy with regards to the emerging conflict in the South China Sea, as well as to Ukraine.

There seems to be a view regarding the perceptions of Israel and the US in Asia. That while the US is losing face because of its support of Israel in the Gaza War, Israel is losing standing because of the perception that it is a core part of the US camp, with emphasis on the affiliation of the current Israeli government with Trump administration.

Nuclear proliferation and regional stability

There is an important lesson to be drawn from the current efforts of North Korea to develop a new generation of inter-continental ballistic missiles that enable it to hit US soil. This has a bearing on the Israel-Iran nuclear balance. Considering Iran’s new status as a nuclear-threshold state, some experts perceive the development of an Israeli-Iranian mutually assured destruction balance as a dynamic that could preserve regional stability. However, if we learn from the North Korean case, reaching basic nuclear capacity that ensures the survival of the regime does not satisfy these regimes. Instead, it become a first phase in the further development of offensive nuclear capabilities in a manner that challenges regional stability.

Conclusion

Within days of President Trump taking office, the uncertainty surrounding his administration remains palpable. The new administration’s policies across all three theaters of conflict will play a critical role in shaping the months and years ahead, determining whether the trajectory will lean toward a continuation or escalation of current conflicts, or a renewed effort to de-escalate and resolve them.

However, this uncertainty also presents an opportunity for regional actors to reassess their reliance on traditional, yet increasingly hesitant, global powers. It opens the door to exploring the development of local, regional, and inter-regional frameworks for addressing ongoing conflicts. In this context, we may witness a significant moment that highlights the "power of the rest."

In the absence of clear global leadership, regional actors—whether European, Asian, or from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—are being driven to take greater initiative in mediating disputes, coordinating positions, and fostering collaboration. While born out of global uncertainty, this shift has the potential to not only exacerbate existing tensions but also create new pathways for cooperation and even prompt a re-evaluation of regional political identities.