Map: Navigating the Geopolitics of a Three-Theatre World

Great power competition is being played out in three theatres: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

While it is true that great powers are vying for influence in every region around the globe, this engagement is not uniform, as there is a hierarchy of interests. For China and Russia, securing their positions within their respective home regions takes precedence over engagement in distant theatres. Many Europeans do not want to decouple from China economically, expand NATO globally, or intervene militarily in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

US allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea, despite their strong support for Ukraine, are focusing their attention and resources on the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, India seeks to prevent its development from being derailed by any entanglement in foreign wars. This sentiment resonates strongly with other countries from the Global South, which are seeking to avoid taking sides in the great power contests of the Global North. And having to deal with two hot wars and the potential for a third one, the Trump administration may also adhere to a hierarchy of interests across different regions and layer its engagement accordingly.

Taking this hierarchy of interests into account, what will be the main theatres of great power contestation after the end of Pax Americana? By definition, a major theatre for great power contestation involves: a challenge to US hegemony in the region; the potential for a war with spillover effects extending far beyond the immediate region; the involvement of non-resident major powers in a conflict, even if they are not direct protagonists; and at least one nuclear power perceiving its core interests to be so threatened that it would consider the existential risk of using nuclear weapons. Three theatres match these criteria: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.

The existence of three primary theatres of great power contestation—with hot wars raging in two and the possibility of conflict in the third—marks the end of Pax Americana; the costs of upholding it are prohibitive. Combined with democratic and fiscal constraints in the United States, a three-theatre world poses a formidable challenge to American primacy. A strategic shift from winning to managing great power competition would align more closely with the general instincts of the Trump II administration, and the outlook of America’s anxious allies and partners.